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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to examine the paradox that despite the growing role of FDI in most 
economies and growth in their share of employment, exports and innovation (‘direct 
spillovers’), evidence of technological spillovers to domestic firms in the host economy 
(‘indirect spillovers’) is sparse. Given the explicit dependence of the development 
strategies of developing countries on FDI after liberalization, it is important for us to ask: 
Why are these indirect spillovers not occurring? The evidence examined here shows that 
for the case of Argentina, there are direct spillovers in the form of human capital 
development and employment. However, there is no evidence of significant positive 
indirect spillovers to non-affiliated firms in Argentina. Part of this paradox may be 
explained by the fact that MNEs have acquired the most technologically competitive of 
their domestic rivals, and crowded out others. However, we postulate that there are a 
variety of other economic reasons why FDI may prove to be less useful as a driver of 
industrial development than has previously been argued. The extent to which direct 
spillovers result in indirect spillovers is intermediated by a number of factors, associated 
with the MNE and the nature of its assets and the organization of its global operations; 
the influence of increased cross-border competition on the distribution, concentration and 
competence level of affiliates and domestic firms, and the nature and extent of the 
absorptive capacity of the domestic sector. 
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Exploring the relationship between direct and indirect spillovers from FDI in 
Argentina  
 
Rajneesh Narula and Anabel Marin  
 
1 Introduction 
It is generally accepted that attracting and embedding inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has important development effects because FDI may represent an 
important source of technological spillovers. Although not the only means available, 
spillovers from FDI are regarded as one of the most practical and efficient means by 
which industrial development and upgrading can be promoted (Dunning and Narula 
2004). Indeed, FDI is actively being promoted by the Washington consensus as a panacea 
for economic development. Structural adjustment programmes prominently integrate 
macroeconomic stabilization policies alongside policies to promote increased inward 
FDI.  As a consequence, inward FDI is now actively sought by most developing 
countries. However, while the potential for MNE-related spillovers is clear, the nature, 
level and extent of the benefits vary considerably, and the outcomes from a FDI-assisted 
industrial policy are not always positive (Lall and Narula 2004).   
One of the most significant aspects of potentially positive spillovers are those 
associated with and through human capital development. Human capital development has 
been recognised as one of the main drivers of economic growth (e.g., Romer, 1990). 
MNEs can influence human capital development in the host country through direct 
means, as MNEs contribute to the generation of employment in the host country, which is 
to say they can increase the employment level quantitatively. 
Despite the importance given to MNEs they do not, however, account for a major 
force in employment; they are estimated to represent less than 2% of total employment in 
the developing world.  Thus, the contribution to domestic employment from FDI does not 
seem very impressive, from a quantitative point of view at least. However, MNEs tend to 
be concentrated in the more ‘dynamic’ sectors of the economy (Harrison, 1999). Thus, 
even though they play a relatively small role in most economies in terms of level of total 
employment, MNEs often play a disproportionately large role in two very different types 
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of industrial sectors. On the one hand, they tend to concentrate their activities in the more 
competitive or dynamic sectors typified by high growth rates and the use of new and 
emerging technologies (e.g., electronics, communication equipment, and industrial 
machinery). On the other, MNEs tend to dominate in mature sectors where economies of 
scale, branding and advertising determine market share (e.g., petroleum products, 
chemicals, automobiles, food and beverages and consumer goods). In such sectors, while 
the technology underlying these industries may be diffused and codified, capital 
limitations and marketing capabilities have meant that just a few MNEs maintain a large 
share of the global market.   
MNEs can also cause direct increases in the quality of the domestic workforce, by 
providing formal and informal training, as well as through the process of learning-by-
doing transferring their firm-specific technological knowledge to their domestic 
employees.  
In addition to these direct effects, MNEs can furthermore affect human capital 
through indirect means, again both quantitatively and qualitatively. This occurs on a 
quantitative level if domestic suppliers and customers increase their own employment as 
a consequence of the increased economic activity of MNEs in the host economy. It occurs 
on a qualitative level if, firstly, MNE affiliates provide training and technical assistance 
to domestic suppliers and clients and secondly, if domestic firms gain access to more 
productive pools of potential employees who have been trained by MNE affiliates in 
newer and more productive technologies. According to the literature, the qualitative 
indirect effects are one of the more efficient sources of FDI-related technology spillovers 
since new technologies introduced by MNEs can move across foreign and domestic firms 
through the physical movement of workers who have been exposed to the technology.  
Despite the clear potential for various kinds of spillover effects, empirical studies 
have not indicated that widespread and significant spillover effects are common. Instead, 
much of the evidence is contradictory (Lipsey, 2002, Gorg and Strobl, 2001). As 
Smarzynska (2002) puts it, “The difficulties associated with disentangling different 
effects at play and data limitations have prevented researchers from providing conclusive 
evidence of positive externalities resulting from FDI”.  
In this paper, we intend to disentangle several of these effects to develop a 
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preliminary understanding of why MNE spillovers remain somewhat ambiguous, 
particularly in developing countries, paying particular attention to human capital 
development. We will also examine new empirical evidence of direct and indirect effects 
of FDI in a host intermediate country, namely Argentina. We base this analysis on the 
Innovation Survey in Argentina.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 
presents a literature review of FDI-related benefits, considering the theory and evidence 
on both direct and indirect effects.  In section 3 we discuss some of the reasons why 
direct spillover effects do not translate into indirect technological spillovers in developing 
countries that have liberalised their economies. In section 4 we present the results of our 
estimations for Argentina. First we investigate direct effects from FDI on human capital 
development and other indicators of technological behaviour. Second, we discuss the 
results of our estimations of indirect effects from FDI. Finally, section 5 draws out some 
broader conclusions.  
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Direct spillovers 
Direct human capital development is one of the main potential contributions of FDI 
insofar as human resources can play a crucial role not only in the dissemination of 
technological knowledge from MNEs to the domestic sector, but also in the dissemination 
of best practices and other organizational innovations which are more difficult to 
disseminate in other ways. These benefits are expected to arise through two means. First, 
there is expected to be a tangible increase in the employment levels of qualified workers 
in the host location. Second, there is expected to be an increase in the quality of the 
workers potentially available to work in other companies or to start their own companies 
in the same country. This arises through the (expected) provision of formal training and 
education to MNE workers or potential workers.   
Trained workers expand the knowledge base of firms and can benefit them in 
number of ways. They can stimulate the implementation of superior technologies and 
innovation, and also improve the absorptive capabilities of firms, which help them to 
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learn from other sources. These workers also, when they move to other firms, move 
specific knowledge learnt in the subsidiary, which may not be possible to obtain in any 
other way.  
Despite the enormous importance of this potential contribution of FDI to human 
capital development in developing countries, there are few empirical studies on this topic. 
In the theoretical literature, Fosfuri et al (2001) have recently demonstrated the conditions 
under which direct and indirect effects on human capital development emerge in 
association with FDI. They show that MNEs train local workers only when they need to 
use superior technologies in the foreign subsidiary. Under these conditions, however, 
they argue that the MNEs pay a higher salary to local workers in order to prevent them 
from moving to a local competitor, thereby dissipating proprietary technology.  
Glass and Saggi (2002) provide a formal representation of the movement of trained 
workers from MNEs to domestic firms as a channel for spillover effects. However, in the 
same way as Fosfuri et al (2001), they conclude that MNEs may pay a wage premium to 
prevent local firms from hiring their workers and gaining access to their superior 
knowledge. Thus, although there is a benefit from FDI due to the wage premium, the 
benefit of technology transfer to local firms is less probable. Moreover, they argue that if 
this benefit occurs at all it will happen in industrialised regions where MNEs do not have 
as substantial advantage over domestic firms. 
Empirical work on this specific topic is even more scant and the evidence is far 
from conclusive. In relation to training effects, early studies from different countries 
seem to point all in the same direction. MNEs are important providers of training (ILO, 
1981, Lindsey, 1986). This has been confirmed for the UK (see Sousa, 2001) as well as 
the Czech Republic (Djankov and Hoekman, 1999) and in Kenya (Gershenberg, 1987). 
Gershenberg (1987), however, also showed that a “much smaller proportion of all 
managers trained in MNEs firms move to the non-MNE sector than is true of managers 
employed for other kind of firms”, which reduce the opportunities for indirect or spillover 
effects. The same was found recently in a study in Costa Rica (Ciarli and Giuliani 2005). 
In a recent study by Gorg and Strobl (2004) based on firm level data for 
manufacturing firms in Ghana , firms whose entrepreneurs had worked for MNEs in the 
same industry were more productive than domestic firms whose entrepreneurs had not 
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worked in the MNE sector. No such effect is found however, when the entrepreneur 
worked before in a MNE in a different industry. The authors suggest that at least some of 
the MNE’s knowledge is specific to the industry, and cannot be transferred to others. 
Bloom (1992) also finds substantial technology transfer via movement of professionals 
from MNEs to the domestic sector in South Korea, and Pack identifies important 
movements of workers between the two sectors- foreign and domestic- in the electronic 
industry  for Taiwan (Glass and Saggi, 2002).  
 
2.2 Indirect spillovers  
 
We now turn our attention to indirect effects. In many cases the indirect transfer of 
technological knowledge to domestic agents might occur through backward and forward 
linkages when MNEs provide training and technical assistance to their local suppliers, 
subcontractors and customers.  MNE subsidiaries need to interact with domestic external 
economic agents (in particular, firms and non-firms) in order to carry out their normal 
operations in the country, and these interactions may disseminate skills and technological 
transfer to the rest of the host economy.  
Local competitors might also benefit from subsidiaries’ presence when subsidiaries 
demonstrate new technologies and new ways to use them, or when highly skilled staff, 
trained in the foreign firm, move to incumbent domestic plants taking with them 
knowledge acquired in the affiliates.  
The effects from increased competition due to FDI are not so clear. Ideally, 
increased competition resulting from FDI might induce domestic technological 
improvements by contributing to the elimination of inefficient indigenous firms, 
encouraging the birth of new innovative firms and inducing local firms to react to the 
foreign threats by assimilating foreign technologies and mobilising resources. Caves 
(1974) and Chung (2001) argue that this should not be considered a spillover effect 
because it does not involve any flow of knowledge. In addition, as noted by Aitken and 
Harrison (1999), increased competition associated with foreign presence might also 
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reduce the productivity of domestically owned firms if foreign firms draw demand from 
them and the domestic firms have to cut production and increase costs 1. 
Much of the evidence points to very limited indirect benefits from FDI. Earlier 
studies, mostly based on industry level data and cross sectional analysis, found positive 
results (e.g. Caves 1974 or Globerman, 1979). However, positive results from this type of 
research design can be explained by reasons other than the existence of technology spill-
overs from FDI. In particular, Aitken and Harrison (1999) have noted an important 
identification problem: MNEs tend to operate in relatively high-productivity sectors in 
the host economy. The relatively high incidence of FDI in an industry may induce the 
exit of less competitive domestic firms, thus raising the average productivity level of the 
industry because of the larger share of technologically superior foreign firms in its 
output2, rather than by diffusing any productivity raising technology to domestic firms.  
It is now generally accepted that cross sectional industry-level studies are unable to 
identify the relevant causality. Consequently, recent studies have exclusively used firm-
level designs, typically combined with the use of panel data analysis. This provides better 
tools to solve the causal identification problem3. The effect of these methodological 
changes has been quite striking. The generally positive results in the earlier generation of 
studies have largely disappeared, both for advanced industrial economies - e.g. Sweden 
(Braconier et al., 2001) or the USA (Chung, 2001), and also when they are transition or 
industrialising economies - see for example Haddad and Harrison, (1991 and 1993) on 
Morocco, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on Czech Republic, Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
on Venezuela, and Konings, (1999) on Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
The evidence would seem to suggest that direct spillovers in terms of employment, 
training and so forth are relatively unambiguous and are in general positive. On the other 
hand, FDI does not necessarily deliver the indirect benefits expected by industrialising 
                                                 
1 Indeed there is no agreement about the relationship between FDI, competition and technical change in 
domestic firms. Conventional wisdom has mostly argued that FDI will introduce more competition in local 
market and therefore that local efficiency will be improved. However, some empirical works have found 
that FDI may increase concentration rather than competition, although it is also argued that sometimes 
concentration may promote innovation.   
2 Caves (1974) has denominated this effect, changes in the allocative efficiency. 
3 But it has not addressed the problem that, if the competitive pressure effects (‘pseudo-spill-overs’) are not 
partialled out, positive results might still be obtained in the absence of ‘genuine’ knowledge spillovers. 
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countries. Many developing countries have explicitly built their industrial development 
strategies on the premise that FDI provides considerable, tangible indirect spillovers and 
externalities that accrue to domestic firms, it behoves us to ask why, and to explore the 
specific circumstances under which different type of effects arise.  The next section will 
seek to provide a preliminary explanation for this paradox.  
 
3 Understanding why FDI does not always result in substantial indirect spillovers 
 
As discussed in the previous section, MNE benefits to the host economy in the form 
of indirect spillovers are not always positive or tangible.  While there are often direct 
spillovers that derive from FDI activity, it is not always clear that these translate into 
indirect benefits to the host economy at large. Although some of the results are influenced 
by methodological and data-driven limitations, we postulate that there are a variety of 
economic reasons why FDI may prove to be less useful as a driver of industrial upgrading 
and development than has previously been argued. We argue in this section that the 
extent to which direct spillovers result in indirect spillovers is intermediated by a number 
of factors, associated mainly with, 1) the MNE and the nature of its assets and the 
organization of its global operations; 2) The influence of liberalization on the host 
country’s economic structure; 3) the nature and extent of the absorptive capacity of the 
domestic sector. 
These factors are themselves highly interdependent. It is important to acknowledge 
that MNEs are rarely interested in the explicit transfer of knowledge. Ceteris paribus, 
they prefer to use technologies that are suited (first and foremost) to their own needs, and 
the purposes for which they have made the investment. MNEs tailor their investment 
decisions to the existing market needs, and the relative quality of location advantages, 
especially skills and capabilities in which the domestic economy has a comparative 
advantage (Lall 2002: 17).  
 
3.1 The nature MNE firm-specific assets 
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There are two points we wish to make: First, that while it is a reasonable 
assumption that MNEs are in possession of superior firm-specific assets, the assets that 
they bring to any given location are not always those which domestic firms necessarily 
seek to acquire- or even – are able to acquire. Keep in mind that the MNE’s competitive 
advantages derive from two types of firm-specific assets: First there are those associated 
with technological assets in the traditional sense, such as machinery and equipment, and 
in the personnel who operate and maintain them. These are asset-specific ownership 
advantages, and it is these that the economics literature concentrate on as being the source 
and basis for spillovers (see e.g., Markusen 1998, Carr et al 2001).  The second type of 
firm-specific assets are those associated with conducting transactions efficiently, that 
derive from being able to generate rent by virtue of superior use of intra-firm hierarchies, 
both within and across national borders.  This group also include those that derive by 
virtue of the multinationality of the firms and can be termed ‘advantages of common 
governance’. These are transaction-type firm-specific assets (see Dunning 1993, Cantwell 
and Narula 2001). MNEs can exist in the absence of technology type ownership 
advantages, generating rent simply from its superior knowledge of markets and 
hierarchies. Thus, MNEs may possess the same (or even ‘inferior’) technology-type 
assets relative to its domestic counterparts, yet still out-compete them. For instance, 
simply a privileged access to a market, access to suppliers and other parts of the MNE 
network. In such cases, indirect technological spillovers - in the conventional way they 
are understood and measured - will not occur. However, other types of spillovers might 
occur, and they will affect other dimensions rather than the technological ones in 
domestic firms.  
Second, it is an unreasonable assumption that domestic firms will automatically 
benefit from MNE assets, either because the domestic firms do not have the capacity to 
do so, or because the assets are strongly firm-specific in nature as is the case with 
transaction-type ownership advantages. That is, such transaction-type firm-specific assets 
cannot be acquired easily since they are highly tacit, firm-specific and largely uncodified, 
and are acquired only gradually. This makes quantitatively measuring such spillovers 
incredibly difficult, and it should not be expected that such benefits will accrued in the 
short or medium term.  
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3.2 The motive of the FDI and the level of competence of MNE subsidiaries.  
 
The motive of an investment helps to determine (in conjunction with the host-
country specific factors) the kind of MNE affiliate and therefore the potential for 
spillovers. It is generally acknowledged that there are four main motives for investment: 
to seek natural resources; to seek new markets; to restructure existing foreign production 
through rationalisation, and to seek strategically related created assets (Narula and 
Dunning 2000). These in turn can be broadly divided into two types. The first three 
represent motives which are primarily asset-exploiting in nature: that is, the investing 
company's primary purpose is to generate economic rent through the use of its existing 
firm-specific assets. The last is a case of asset-augmenting activity, whereby the firm 
wishes to acquire additional assets, which protect or augment their existing created assets 
in some way. In general, developing countries are unlikely to attract much asset-
augmenting FDI. Developing countries have tended to receive FDI that is primarily 
resource-seeking, market-seeking or efficiency seeking, and the relative importance of 
each is a function of the stage of economic development which itself is a function of the 
quality of its absorptive capacity (Narula and Dunning 2000, Narula 2002). Least 
developed countries will tend to have a predominance of resource-seeking FDI, while in 
countries such as Argentina, which can be regarded as being in the catching-up stage, a 
majority of FDI might be directed towards market-seeking, while efficiency seeking 
investments would be the exception rather than the rule. Resource-seeking FDI would 
still be important, but of less significance than market-seeking FDI. As countries 
approach the frontier (e.g., NICs), efficiency seeking FDI will tend to dominate (Narula 
2002). 
Once the decision to enter a given market through FDI is taken, the kinds of activity 
and the level of competence of the subsidiary are co-determined by the nature of the 
location advantages of the host location. That is to say, while MNE internal factors such 
as their internationalization strategy, the role of the new location in their global portfolio 
of subsidiaries, and the motivation of their investment are pivotal in the structure of their 
investment, they are dependent on the available location-specific resources which can be 
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used for that purpose. Indeed, the host country’s location advantages play an important 
role in determining the level of embeddedness of the subsidiary (Benito et al 2003), and 
this is the primary determinant of the quality of the FDI. High competence subsidiaries 
require complementary assets that are non-generic in nature, and are often associated with 
agglomeration effects, clusters, and the presence of highly specialized skills. In other 
words, firms are constrained in their choice of location of high competence subsidiaries 
by resource availability. For instance, R&D activities tend to be concentrated in a few 
locations because the appropriate specialized resources are associated with a few specific 
locations. MNE investments in high value-added activities (often associated with high 
competence levels) have the tendency to be ‘sticky’. Such subsidiaries tend to be 
embedded with the local milieu in terms of linkages with suppliers, customers and 
domestic institutions. The linkages are both formal and informal, and will probably have 
taken years – if not decades – to create and sustain.  As such, the embeddedness of firms 
is often (but not always) a function of how long the MNEs have been present, since firms 
tend to build incrementally. This has been observed to be the case in East Asia (See e.g., 
Rasiah 1994, 1995), but it is to be noted that firms build on location advantages that 
already exist in the host economy (Ritchie 2002), and increases in embeddedness are 
generally in response to improvements in the domestic technological and absorptive 
capacity.  
The point here is that not all affiliates provide the same opportunity for spillovers 
(see Marin and Bell, 2005, and Bell and Marin, 2005). A sales office may have a high 
turnover, employ a large staff, but the indirect spillovers to other co-located firms will be 
smaller than, say, a manufacturing facility. Likewise, resource-seeking activities, can be 
capital intensive, employ many staff, but also provide fewer spillovers than say, a market-
seeking type of FDI.  
 
3.3 The restructuring of MNE affiliates’ after economic liberalisation 
Prior to economic liberalization, MNEs responded to investment opportunities 
primarily by establishing miniature replicas of their facilities at home, although the extent 
to which they were truncated varied considerably between countries. The extent of 
truncation was determined by a number of factors, but by far the most important 
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determinant of truncation- and thereby the scope of activities and competence level of the 
subsidiary - were associated with market size, and capacity and capability of domestic 
industry (Dunning and Narula 2004). There is thus a hierarchy of the quality of FDI 
activity in the developing countries which reflects the stage of industrial development. At 
the ‘bottom’, least developed countries without a domestic sector and with low demand 
have been host to the most truncated subsidiaries, often to the point of being single-
activity subsidiaries. Activities were primarily in sales and marketing, and natural 
resource extraction. The most advanced economies with domestic technological capacity 
have hosted the least truncated subsidiaries, often with R&D departments.   
Developing countries have not necessarily benefitted from an increase in the quality 
of FDI that they receive because of liberalization. Although there has been some 
investment in new affiliates resulting in new (greenfield) subsidiaries that did not exist 
previously, there has also been a downgrading of subsidiaries. MNEs may divest their 
operations in response to better opportunities elsewhere in the, or reduce the intensity of 
operations by lowering the level of competence and/or scope of their subsidiary, and 
shifting from truncated replicas to single activity affiliates.  There may also be a 
redistribution effect. That is, sectors that were dominated by domestic capital were 
transferred to foreign ownership. This has also, in many cases, led to a downgrading of 
activities from truncated replica to single activity affiliates, and a reduction in 
employment to reduce duplication between locations within the MNE. 
MNEs have taken advantage of liberalization to rationalise production capacity in 
fewer locations to exploit economies of scale, especially where local consumption 
patterns are not radically different to justify local capacity and where transportation costs 
are not prohibitive. This has meant that some miniature replicas have been downgraded to 
sales and marketing affiliates, which can be expected to have fewer opportunities for 
spillovers.  It is ironic that the countries that receive the kinds of FDI that has the highest 
potential benefits vis-à-vis industrial development are those that already have a highly 
developed domestic absorptive capacity (Narula and Marin 2003). Domestic capacity in 
the same industry – whether in the form of knowledge infrastructure or efficient domestic 
industrial sector - is a primary determinant of high competence foreign affiliates, and 
therefore tangible and significant indirect spillovers.  
 13
As firms increasingly use global production networks, MNEs locate their activities 
to take advantage of the most strategic fit to their global operations, and this often means 
that they make no significant efforts to create linkages with the domestic economy. In a 
perfectly liberalised world, MNEs have no incentive to encourage the development of 
domestic firms to meet their needs since they can do so using either imports or FDI. In an 
extreme case, there may actually be no indirect spillovers from FDI, because MNEs will 
prefer to locate production in a regionally optimal location and simply import all their 
inputs. Where this has happened, the market share of MNEs has risen, while at the same 
time, their contribution to the host economy (such as direct and indirect employment) has 
actually fallen.  
 
3.4 Absorptive capacity as a determinant of linkages 
 
Several studies have pointed to the fact that indirect benefits generally only accrue 
to domestic firms in the same industry as the MNE (vertical spillovers), and rarely are 
there significant inter-industry, horizontal spillovers. For indirect spillovers of either 
kind, however, two pre-conditions must be met. First a domestic sector must exist, and 
second, that they possess the capacity to usefully internalise the knowledge being made 
available by the MNE (indirectly or directly). In other words, the domestic industry must 
possess the absorptive capacity to efficiently exploit spillovers.  The presence of a viable 
domestic sector is not a condition that is always met, since MNEs (and their well-
established global supply chains) often tend to crowd-out existing domestic firms (Agosin 
and Mayer 2000), or in other cases, acquire the more competent domestic firms. This is 
particularly true in the the catching-up countries where foreign capital has substituted for 
domestic capital, taking over domestic firms through M&A that possessed technological 
resources but were unable to produce as efficiently with MNEs after liberalization. 
It is essential when trying to appreciate the importance of absorptive capability to 
take a systems view of an economy, and by doing so acknowledge that all the economic 
firm and non-firm actors within an industry are indivisibly interlinked.  If the institutions 
and organisations are absent or underdeveloped, economic actors within the system will 
be unable to absorb and efficiently internalise knowledge. Absorptive capacity includes 
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the ability to internalise knowledge created by others and modifying it to fit their own 
specific applications, processes and routines (Narula 2004). It is worth noting that 
absorptive capacity is a subset of technological capability, which in addition to absorptive 
capability includes the ability to generate new technologies through non-imitative means.  
This does not imply that absorption is purely about imitation. Firms cannot absorb 
outside knowledge unless they invest in their own R&D, because it can be highly specific 
to the originating firm, since it has a partly tacit nature. The extent to which a firm is able 
to exploit external sources of knowledge thus depends on its absorptive capacity which is 
assumed to be a function of its R&D efforts, and the degree to which outside knowledge 
corresponds to the firm’s needs as well as the general complexity of the knowledge. An 
important component of absorptive capacity is the availability of an appropriate supply of 
human capital, which in turn is not always specific to firms, but associated with the 
capabilities of the non-firm sector. Non-firms determine the knowledge infrastructure that 
supplements and supports firm-specific innovation. They account for a certain portion of 
the stock of knowledge at the national level which may be regarded as ‘general 
knowledge’ in the sense that it has characteristics of a public good, and is potentially 
available to all firms that seek to internalise it for rent generation.   
Thus, even where technological assets are made available through spillovers from 
inward FDI the domestic sector may not be in a position to internalise these assets. 
Borenzstein et al (1998) and Xu (2000) have both shown that FDI has a positive impact 
on economic growth only in those developing countries that have attained a certain 
minimum level of absorptive capacity. Knowledge accumulation is much more rapid 
once the initial threshold level of absorptive capacity exists. Simply put, technology 
absorption is easier, once they have ‘learned-to-learn’ (Criscuolo and Narula 2002). The 
cost of imitation increases as the follower closes the gap with the leader and the number 
of technologies potentially available for imitation reduces.  
 
4 The Case of Argentina 
Our analysis is supported by detailed firm level data from two Innovation Surveys 
in Argentina. The first Survey covers the period 1992-1996, the second, the period 1998-
2001.  Argentina is a particularly interesting example for this study given that (as a result 
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of rapid FDI growth in the 1990s) its manufacturing industry has become heavily 
dependent on foreign firms: 49.6 % of the largest industrial firms in 2002 were MNEs. 
When joint ventures are included, this figure rises to 77%. Moreover, Argentina has had a 
historical dependence on MNEs, and is regarded to have achieved a threshold level of 
absorptive capabilities. The Innovation Survey in Argentina, following the broad 
framework of the Oslo Manual, covers numerous aspects of the economic and 
technological behaviour of 1533 firms (283 of which are MNEs). The survey sample is 
representative of the universe of industrial firms in the country, and includes 50% of the 
total industrial firms, which account for 53% of total sales, 50% of total employment, and 
61% of total exports (The Annex in Narula and Marin (2003) describes the firms and 
information covered by the dataset).  Table 1 gives the industrial distribution of the 
different types of affiliates, utilising the Ferraz classification. Ferraz allocates into five 
broad categories all the 4-digit manufacturing industries (SIC codes). The taxonomy is 
similar in principle to the OECD and other classifications of industries in terms of their 
technology-intensity. However, recognising that the same industry codes may incorporate 
very different technological characteristics in different economic contexts, it was 
developed to differentiate industries in the Latin American context. The categories and 
example industries are shown in the Annex . 
 
***Table 1 about here*** 
 
The case of Argentina illustrates to some extent the general phenomena discussed 
earlier. The increased role of MNEs in certain sectors is in part a result of aggressive 
liberalisation of FDI regimes and privatisation programmes. Indeed, the greatest change 
has been the reduction in state ownership and the subsequent privatisation of assets. As 
table 2 shows, between 1996 and 2001, foreign firms substantially increased their 
participation in a number of sectors in terms of sales. Sectors where the share of MNE 
sales increased included communications equipment, from 49% of total sales in 1996 to 
around 94% in 2001, and motor vehicles, from 54 % to 96% of sales in 2001. FDI also 
dominates sectors such as petroleum with around 90% of total sales, chemicals with 
around 66% of sales, and fabricated metal products, with around 59% of total sales It is 
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worth noting, however, that in a number of sectors (e.g., textiles, precision, medical and 
optical equipment, rubber and plastics, electronics) the share of FDI in total sales as well 
as in employment declined substantially over the same period.  It is interesting to note 
that in several sectors, employment either decreased more substantially than sales of 
MNEs. In certain sectors such as food, paper, lumber and wood products, leather 
products, the share of MNE sales increased or stayed constant while employment 
declined, indicating the possible increase of intra-firm exports substituting for local 
production. In yet other sectors increases in share of sales were shadowed by a smaller 
proportional increase in employment share, suggesting the use of economies of scale or 
the use of global supply chains of MNEs.  
 
***Table 2 about here*** 
 
4.1 Examining direct effects of FDI in Argentina 
 
In this sub-section the evidence for the Argentinean case is used to evaluate the 
direct contribution of FDI to domestic human capital development. Our data allows us to 
identify an interesting sub-group within the group of MNEs affiliates, firms that were 
acquired by MNEs between 1996 and 1998. Thus, by comparing changes in human 
development indicators for firms that were acquired by MNEs, relative to other domestic 
firms and subsidiaries, we are able to identify the effects that emerge exclusively as a 
consequence of FDI.  
Table 3 summarises some general features of these three groups of firms, 
specifically average size, market share, investment intensity and export intensity. Some 
interesting issues can be appreciated by looking at these indicators. First, that acquired 
firms were rather atypical for their group before they changed hands. They were three 
times bigger than the average domestic firm, and had a slightly higher market share and 
propensity to export. The intensity of investment was the same as the other domestic 
firms. Second, both acquired and MNE subsidiaries –but especially the acquired ones- 
reduced size in the second period, and increased substantially their market share and 
export intensity, compared to domestic firms. Nonetheless, as expected, subsidiaries 
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perform better on all indicators, as compared with domestic firms. They are much bigger, 
possess a higher market share, and invest and export a higher proportion of their total 
sales. It is interesting to note that the export intensity of the acquired firms increased 
substantially between 1992 and 1998.  
 
***Table 3 about here*** 
 
Table 4, 5 and 6 summarise the results of the analysis on the impact of FDI on 
human development. The human development indicators evaluated are the following: use 
of professional workers (engineers and other professionals), an index of skills 
(professional/non-professional workers), expenditures on training activities, and intensity 
of professionals workers dedicated to R&D activities. In addition, table 7 provides some 
evidence on the evolution of R&D intensity.  
Measurements in Tables from 4 to 7 are reported in absolute levels (means) and as 
intensities. Thus, for example, a value of 11 in column 1 in table 4 indicates that domestic 
firms employ 11 professional workers, in average, and that this group of workers 
represents 5% of the total force for the average domestic firm.  
 
***Table 4 about here*** 
 
Data from table 4 reveals several issues. First, acquired firms appear again as 
atypical when compared with the other domestic firms before the acquisition, which 
confirms that foreign firms tended to acquire domestic firms which on average had a 
similar skills level to their own, as well as the firms with the highest absorptive capacity. 
Second, subsidiaries hire a larger number of professional workers, both in absolute levels 
and as a proportion of their workforce. In 1992 for instance, subsidiaries employed 89 
professionals on average whilst domestic firms only employed 11. These differences 
increased substantially over time. By 2001, the typical subsidiary increased the average 
number of professionals to 111, acquired firms declined to 56, and domestic firms 
remained at the same level.  
Although on average acquired firms decreased the level of professional workers, at 
the same time they increased the intensity of skilled workers. This would again suggest 
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that the firms acquired were among the most dynamic and with the greatest absorptive 
capacity, but that after acquisition, considerable rationalisation was undertaken by the 
MNE to eliminate duplication and achieve economies of scale.    
Similar results are suggested when we examine expenditures on training (Table 5). 
Subsidiaries spent on average 8 times as much as domestic firms on training in 1998, and 
by 2001 this had increased to a factor of 10. On a per worker basis, which allows us to 
adjust for the relative differences in the size of establishment, domestic firms showed a 
decline in the expenditures on training per worker, while subsidiaries and acquired firms 
increased these expenditures between 1998 and 2001. Subsidiaries had higher levels of 
training expenditures, both in absolute levels and in intensity, and they most increased the 
absolute level of expenditure. However, this is not fully reflected in the evolution of 
intensities because subsidiaries increased employment substantially as well.  
 
***Table 5 about here*** 
 
Over the period 1992 to 2001, MNE affiliates spent around 30 or 40% more than 
domestic firms on R&D.  As table 6 shows, on average MNE subsidiaries had 7 R&D 
employees compared to domestic firms which averaged less than 2 in 1998, although 
when adjusted for size, this represented an identical level of R&D intensity in both 1998 
and 2001. It is worthy of note that in both periods acquired firms had a higher R&D 
intensity as well as a larger average R&D staff than both domestic firms and subsidiaries 
in both periods.  This might suggest that not only did MNEs target the most technology-
intensive domestic firms for acquisition, but that they continued to maintain the level of 
competence of these newly acquired subsidiaries. Despite a large overall reduction in 
employment post-acquisition (table 3), acquired firms did not reduce the level R&D 
activities, such that acquired firms had a R&D intensity in employment of 3.5% 
compared with 2.4% for both domestic firms and subsidiaries in 2001. In effect, after 
they were acquired by foreign capital, this group of firms utilised professionals in R&D 
five times more than domestic firms. This would imply that the acquired firms were 
probably recognised as centres of excellence for innovation within their respective MNE 
networks.  
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***Table 6 about here*** 
 
As discussed in section two, the main potential contribution of MNEs to host countries 
derives from their possession of superior knowledge. One of the best indicators of 
technology-type ownership advantages of a firm is its R&D intensity. Table 7 describes 
changes in R&D intensities based on a ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. This confirms 
the evidence in table 6. Subsidiaries seem to have, at least on average, some knowledge 
superiority to domestic firms., a difference that although substantial, is less important 
than the one identified in other type of indicators as training, or skills. 
 
***Table 7 about here*** 
 
 
In summary, it can be concluded that MNE subsidiaries seem to possess superior 
knowledge resources as compared to domestic firms and they dedicated a relatively larger 
share of resources to human capital development, at least when compared with similar 
domestic firms. Both types of subsidiaries hired more professionals than domestic firms 
of the same size, possessed a more skilled labour force overall, and spent more on 
training than similar domestic firms. They also dedicated more resources to R&D, 
professionals and investments, and in general the analysis of the evolution of these 
indicators indicates a trend in which these differences have become bigger not smaller. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that as resources have moved from domestic to foreign 
capital, there have been improvements in most of the human development indicators: 
skills, training expenditures and the proportion of workers in creative tasks, and also in 
R&D. However, improvements in intensities are also a result of reduction in employment 
after acquisition, as a result of rationalisation of post M&A operations.  
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4.2 Indirect effects on domestic firms  
 
The evidence reviewed above indicates that there are clear human capital-related 
direct benefits from MNE activity in Argentina. This section examines whether these 
benefits result in indirect effects on the productivity and the skill levels of domestic firms.   
Indirect effects are usually evaluated empirically by analysing the level or change 
in productivity of domestic firms that are in some way related with MNE affiliates. This 
empirical model have been considerably extended and refined since the studies pioneered 
by Caves (1974) and Globerman (1978). However, the basic approach has remained 
fundamentally similar. Measures of FDI participation or MNEs presence are related with 
measures of productivity growth in domestic firms, and when the association is positive, 
FDI is claimed to generate technology externalities. The analysis usually models the 
effects within the context of production functions. FDI is treated as an additional “input” 
explaining changes in the productivity of domestic firms that enjoy some point of 
economic contact with foreign firms. Thus, a significant coefficient for FDI is understood 
as evidence consistent with externalities. The typical formulation conventionally assumes 
three things. 
 
1) That the level of productivity achieved by firms depends on the level of the pool 
of general knowledge accessible to it and not only on its own “research” efforts; 
2) That the output differences that can not be attributed to the accumulation of any 
input (conventional input) –the Solow residual- can be visualised as 
technological progress; 
3) That FDI –similar to R&D- augments directly the domestically available stock 
of knowledge in its economic space. 
 
On the basis of these assumptions, it is argued that, (accounting for other factors) 
the rate of productivity growth (or difference) of domestic firms increases when FDI 
increases, FDI must be “moving” domestic plants towards technological improvements.  
The ideal way to evaluate these effects would require identification of domestic 
competitors and suppliers. However, due to data limitations about linkages between the 
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two groups, we seek to evaluate indirect effect through two means. First, we estimate 
indirect effects by following common practice by analysing productivity improvements 
of domestic firms localised in the same 5-digit sectors as the subsidiaries4. Second, we go 
beyond this common methodology by examining FDI indirect effects on human capital 
by modelling a function of skills of domestic firms, which is augmented with indicators 
of FDI participation by industry. Skills are modelled as a function of the size of the firms 
and other indicators of knowledge capital and performance, and as a function of FDI 
participation in the industry, in the same period and with one and two time lags. Thus, the 
coefficient of FDI in this equation should capture two types of effects from FDI. On the 
one hand, the effects of an increased competitive pressure, since domestic firms might 
increase their skills intensity in order to compete with an increased participation of MNEs 
in their industries. On the other, it should capture the effects of movement of qualified 
workers between sectors as long as workers moved within the same 5-digit industry.  
 
Spillovers from FDI using production functions 
 
The results of the externalities or spillovers from FDI are expected to affect domestic 
firms’ productivity growth. FDI is treated as an additional “input” explaining productivity 
growth, and the coefficient of the FDI regressor is taken as evidence consistent with 
spillovers from FDI to the domestic sector. Variations of the following basic equation 
(equation 1’) were used to investigate these effects:  
 
iijtjiij ITZFDItFDIInputY εηϕδλ +++++Δ+Δ=Δ −1lnln  (1’) 
In equation (1’) the subscripts i and j denote plant and industry, Δ represents 
changes in the variables between 1992/ 1996, 1996/1998 and 1998/2001, and λ, δ, ϕ, and 
η the parameters to be estimated. Y denotes added value at plant level, Input, its use of 
normal inputs, FDI is a measure of changes in FDI participation at industry level during 
the period analysed and lagged a period, denoted by subscripts j and t-1, respectively. Z is 
                                                 
4 Due to the lack of data we were not able to test for the possible presence of regional or inter-sectoral 
spillovers.  
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a set of plant and industry level control variables. T and I are dummies for time and 
industries respectively.  
 
For Input, we use total employment (L) and the ratio of investment to added value 
(I/Y).  
 
 FDIpart is the share of total employment in the 5-digit industry j that is accounted for 
by all employment in foreign owned firms in the industry.5 We use an indicator based 
on employment rather than capital because labour turnover is likely to be a 
particularly important channel for spillover effects.  
 
 G is a categorical dummy variable that distinguishes independent domestic firms 
from those that are part of a domestic conglomerate. 
 
 I is a dummy variable distinguishing the 22 two-digit industries. 
 
 Z includes a set of additional variables that may affect TFP’ growth in domestic 
firms:  
 (a) Δ KCd    =  change in knowledge capital, as reflected in R&D expenditures 
plus changes in the expenditure on new equipment specifically 
concerned with product or process innovation6 
 (b) Δ Skillsd  = change in the professional/non professional ratio (professionals 
include engineers and other professionals in production, 
administration and R&D) 
                                                 
5 This indicator was constructed on the basis of the information provided by the 50% sample survey 
because the data about FDI penetration at the 5-digit level for the whole economy does not exist. However, 
the Survey sample included all of the 500 largest industrial firms in Argentina. Since MNE subsidiaries in 
manufacturing industries in Argentina are typically large, almost all of them are probably included in the 
sample of 283 subsidiaries. 
6 R&D expenditure is not a good indicator of the technological efforts of firms in developing countries in 
augmenting their knowledge capital, since such efforts are generally not formalised as explicit R&D 
activities. We therefore include expenditures on equipment for product or process innovation as an 
additional indicator of these efforts. 
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 (c) Δ Compd  = changes in competition.  
 
We expect that the increases in KC and Skills will positively affect changes in total 
factor productivity of domestic firms through their effects on their knowledge capital 
(Griliches 1991). Their inclusion therefore reduces the possibility of bias due to non-
included variables that change across domestic firms and over time.  
Variables reflecting changes in competition are also introduced. As discussed 
earlier, FDI might also affect the level of competition in local markets, and through this 
channel, domestic firms’ survival, behaviour and performance. To control for this effect, 
following Sjoholm (1997), Chung (2001), and Haskel et al (2002) we introduce in the 
regression two measures of potential competition: 1) changes in import penetration at the 
5-digit industry level, and 2) changes in industry concentration measured by the changes 
in the Herfindahl index. We expect that - to the extent that these indices reflect changes in 
the levels of competition- changes in allocative and technical efficiency produced by an 
increased FDI should be captured by the index. Additionally, these variables should also 
capture changes in other unobservable variables that affect competition and that might 
have disciplined the domestic industry to become more efficient. Improvements in the 
efficiency of domestic industry are particularly relevant, as Argentina undertook 
significant market reforms during the period in question.  
 
The expanded equation is as follows: 
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Where: 
ΔlnY i = The log change in value added 
ΔlnLi = The log change in total employment 
I/Li = The ratio of total investment to total output 1992 
ΔFDIpartj = The change in FDI participation by industry  
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FDIpartt-1 =   FDI participation in the previous period7 
ΔSkillsi = The change in the ratio professional/non professional workers 
ΔKCi = The log change in R&D expenditures plus the log change in the expenditures in 
new equipment for product and process innovation 
ΔConcenj = The change in Herfindahl index- industry level  
ΔImpenj = The change in import penetration –industry level 
εi =  Δui 
 
By using a plant level specification and modelling in first differences we control for 
fixed differences in productivity levels across industries, which might affect the level of 
foreign investment. In this way, we address the identification problem observed by 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) who have shown that in industry level cross section studies a 
positive result might reflect the fact that foreign firms are attracted to the more productive 
industries rather than a spillover effect8.  
In addition, this specification and the inclusion of industry and year dummies 
correct for the omission of unobservable variables that might undermine the relationship 
between FDI and productivity growth of domestic firms. By observing changes over the 
time we remove plant-specific and industry and region fixed effects such as differences in 
the long-term strategy of the domestic firms, the regional infrastructure and differential 
technological opportunity of the industries.  
 
Skills spillovers from FDI 
 
In order to evaluate the contribution of FDI to skill intensity of domestic firms we 
use a function of skills augmented with FDI participation by industry.  
 
ijtjiiij ITConcentFDItFDIKCLSkillsdf ερϕδαλ +++Δ++Δ++= −1lnln  (2) 
 
                                                 
7 The previous period for 2001 is 1998, for 1998 is 1996 and for 1996 is 1992. 
8 We cannot completely rule out the possibility of spurious correlation if there are industry characteristics 
that change over the time and affect FDI localisation.  
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We define skills intensity of domestic firms as the proportion of professionals to 
total workers per firms.  
The basic function is intended to capture the effects of traditional determinants of 
skills as size, other investments in knowledge capital and the industry. Thus, the 
coefficient of FDI will capture the differential effect of an increased FDI participation in 
the industry of the domestic firms on the use of professional workers.  
 
4.3 Results 
 
Table 8 and 9 show the results for the two different specifications used in order to 
investigate the effects of FDI on domestic firms. Table 8 reports the results of the 
productivity spillovers estimation Table 9 the results for skills spillover estimation. The 
coefficient for ΔFDIj and FDIlag measures FDI indirect effects or spillovers. Thus, if the 
technology superiority of foreign firms spreads at industry level to domestic firms the 
coefficient of ΔFDIj and FDIlag in table 8 should be positive. In the same way, if the 
superior use and development of human resources by subsidiaries spreads to domestic 
firms the coefficient for ΔFDIj and FDIlag in table 9 should be positive. 
 
***Table 8 and 9 about here*** 
 
As can be seen in table 8, the added value of the firms in Argentina increases with 
changes in the employment of domestic firms, their knowledge capital, skills, market 
share and the import penetration at the industry level. However, changes in FDI 
participation at industry level do not seem to contribute to productivity improvements of 
the firms in the same industry: the coefficient for changes in FDI and FDI participation in 
the previous period are not significant.  
In line with previous studies that have used panel data, we find no evidence of 
technological spillovers (or dynamic externalities) from FDI in Argentina between 1992 
and 2001. Benefits of foreign firms’ activities in the Argentinean economy are not 
reflected in domestic firms’ value added growth, even when these activities have a high 
potential for technological spillovers. What are more surprising are the results in table 9, 
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which demonstrate that an increased FDI participation in the same industry in a previous 
period is negatively associated with the skill intensity of the domestic firms.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions.  
This paper has sought to examine the paradox that despite the growing role of FDI in 
most economies, evidence of technological spillovers to domestic firms in the host 
economy is sparse. Given the explicit dependence of the industrial development strategies 
of developing countries on FDI as a source of capital and technology after economic 
liberalization, it is important for us to ask: Why are these indirect spillovers not 
occurring? Indeed, as the evidence examined here has shown for the case of Argentina, 
there are direct spillovers in the form of human capital development and employment. 
However, there is no evidence of significant or positive indirect spillovers to non-
affiliated firms in Argentina.  
There are several explanations for the lack of indirect spillovers to the domestic 
sector: 
1. Increased FDI has had a negative competition effect.  This is a result of two 
trends. First, conventional ‘crowding out’ has occurred: as MNEs increase 
competitive pressure on the domestic sector, domestic firms that have been unable 
to face this pressure choose to de-skill the labour force and move to cheaper 
niches in the market. Second, MNEs have acquired the most technologically 
competitive domestic firms. Thus, these firms can be regarded as also exiting, as 
ownership has been transferred from domestic to foreign. 
2. there is limited real movement of workers between the MNE sector and the 
domestic sector in the host country, due in part to the higher salaries paid by 
MNEs subsidiaries in order to keep their qualified workers and prevent 
dissemination of their superior knowledge (Fosfuri et al 2001). 
3. Spillovers may be occurring, but primarily between MNE affiliates and the 
domestic firms that they have acquired. As these firms were amongst the most 
technologically competitive with the highest absorptive capacity prior to 
acquisition, they would be in the best position to benefit from spillovers. 
However, as these acquired firms are now considered as MNE affiliates as well, 
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while there may be an increased amount of intra-MNE linkages and spillovers, 
this would not show up in our analysis. Our data show that after acquisition, 
considerable rationalisation was undertaken by the MNE to eliminate duplication 
and achieve economies of scale.   
4. As a considerable share of the MNE investment is in traditional sectors and 
commodities (table 2), it may be the case that the kinds of ownership advantages 
that MNE subsidiaries possess are transaction-type advantages and those 
associated with the economies of common governance. These assets are highly 
intangible, and often non-replicable since they are a function of the MNE’s global 
production network and specific to large internationally dispersed and rationalised 
organisations. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest that superior 
technological assets explain their superior performance (Narula and Marin 2003). 
Where spillovers do occur, these may take decades to filter through to the 
domestic sector. Furthermore, as we have discussed in section 3, the motive of 
investment and the structure of the MNEs global configuration influences the 
extent to which subsidiaries are embedded, and the quality of spillovers. The fact 
that FDI activities do not demonstrate significant spillovers to the economy at 
large indicates that not all FDI provides the same opportunities for spillovers and 
linkages.  For instance, resource-exploiting investments (say, in mining) seek to 
provide unprocessed raw materials (a relatively low value adding activity) which 
act as inputs to other affiliates that may be located elsewhere. Resource-seeking 
FDI may employ a large workforce and be capital intensive, but the potential for 
spillovers to domestic firms may be small.  
 
Clearly, further research is needed to examine these effects on an industry-level basis. 
Our earlier study (Narula and Marin 2003) showed that in traditional, more ‘mature’ 
sectors foreign firms seem to have significantly influenced domestic productivity, and 
where foreign firms seem to out-perform domestic firms significantly. In the so-called 
‘dynamic and new technologies’ sectors which are typically regarded as providing the 
highest potential for spillovers, domestic firms tend to outperform foreign affiliates in 
most measures of technological and absorptive capabilities. Indeed, some of the evidence 
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reviewed here suggests that some of the M&A activity may have been of a strategic asset 
augmenting nature, whereby there is a reverse-technology transfer effect (see Criscuolo 
et al 2005 for a discussion). The fact that on average the acquired firms continue to have 
a higher R&D intensity than domestic firms, as well as MNE subsidiaries in general, 
indicates that these new subsidiaries are probably seen as R&D centres of excellence 
within the MNE hierarchy into which they are now embedded.    
Our results confirm the opinion expressed by Mortimore (2000) that although Latin 
American countries have succeeded in attracting a large quantity of FDI, it has thus far 
ignored the issue of quality of FDI. At the same time, our analysis also points to a 
common oversimplification made by researchers in the field: That MNEs tend to possess 
technological assets superior to domestic firms. If FDI is intended to promote domestic 
industrial development, this calls for more careful screening mechanisms.  
The bigger issue that our analysis raises is that a more sceptical approach needs to be 
taken of the Washington consensus and its simplistic view that FDI is a sine qua non for 
economic development. Market forces cannot substitute for the role of governments in 
developing and promoting a proactive industrial policy. MNEs and FDI may well lead to 
an increase in productivity and exports, but they do not necessarily result in increased 
competitiveness of the domestic sector or increased industrial capacity, which ultimately 
determines economic growth in the long run (Lall and Narula 2004). 
To be sure, upgrading of technological capabilities of domestic firms can no longer be 
pursued in quite the same way in a globalising world. International competition is a 
given, and there can be no return to the infant industry model.  Nonetheless, market 
forces cannot substitute for the role of governments in developing and promoting a 
proactive industrial policy. Firms necessarily take a shorter term, profit maximising view 
because they are largely risk averse. FDI per se does not provide growth opportunities 
unless a domestic industrial sector exists which has the necessary technological capacity 
to profit from the externalities from MNE activity. This is well illustrated by the inability 
of many Asian countries which have relied on a passive FDI-dependent strategy to 
upgrade their industrial development. FDI, domestic capabilities and a domestic sector 
need to be concatenated and properly phased if positive results are to be achieved.  
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ANNEX 
DIFFERENTIATING INDUSTRIES USING THE FERRAZ CLASSIFICATION 
 
This classification of industries developed by Ferraz (1992), allocates all the 4-digit 
manufacturing industries (SIC codes) into five broad categories. The taxonomy is similar 
to the OECD and other classifications of industries in terms of their technology-intensity. 
However, recognising that the same industry codes may incorporate very different 
technological characteristics in different economic contexts, it was developed to 
differentiate industries in the particular context of Latin America. The categories and 
example industries are shown below. 
Table 1 illustrates some of the industries included in each one of Ferraz categories, 
Table 2 shows all the 4-digit SIC codes included in each category. 
Table A1:  The Classification of Industries  
Ferraz Categories Illustrative 4-digit SIC Industries  
INDUSTRIAL 
COMMODITIES 
Dyeing and Finishing Textiles 
Paperboard Containers 
Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 
Iron And Steel Foundries 
 
Less 
Technology-
Intensive 
AGRO-BASED 
COMMODITIES 
Canned, and Preserved Fruits 
Animal Fats And Oils 
Grain Mill Products 
Sugar 
 
TRADITIONAL  
SECTORS 
Meat products 
Bakery products 
Apparel 
Soap, Detergents and Cleaning Preparations 
 
DURABLE  
GOODS 
Household Appliances 
Watches 
Motorcycles 
Bicycles and Parts 
 
THE AUTOMOTIVE 
SECTOR 
Motor Vehicles 
Passenger Car Bodies 
Motor Vehicle Equipment 
 
DIFFUSERS OF 
TECHNICAL 
PROGRESS 
Pesticides and Agricultural Chemicals 
Drugs 
Farm Machines 
Machines Tools 
Communication Equipment 
Electrical Industrial Apparatus 
Aircraft and Space Vehicles 
 
More 
Technology-
Intensive 
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When used to differentiate the industries of MNE subsidiaries, the underlying 
principle is: less knowledge-intensive firms in the more traditional and commodity 
industries towards the top of the table are likely to offer more limited spill-over potential 
than more knowledge-intensive firms in the industry categories towards the foot of the 
table.  
 
Table A2 SIC codes distributed by Ferraz classification 
Ferraz Group SIC code 
Industrial Commodities (1711) (1712) (1911) (2010) (2021) 
(2101) (2102) (2109) (2310) (2320) (2411) 
(2412) (2413) (2694) (2696) (2710) (2720) 
(3130) (3150) 
Agro-based commodities (1513) (1514) (1531) (1532) (1533) 
(1542) 
 
Traditional Goods (1511) (1512) (1520) (1541) (1543) 
(1544) (1549) (1551) (1552) (1553) (1554) 
(1600) (1721) (1722) (1723) (1729) (1730) 
(1810) (1820) (1912) (1920) (2022) (2023) 
(2029) (2211) (2212) (2213) (2219) (2221) 
(2222) (2230) (2424) (2429) (2430) (2519) 
(2520) (2610) (2691) (2692) (2693) (2695) 
(2699) (2731) (2732) (2811) (2812) (2813) 
(2891) (2893) (2899) (3140) (3190) (3610) 
(3691) (3692) (3693) (3694) (3699) 
Durable Goods (2930) (3230) (3320) (3330) (3512) 
(3591) (3592) (3599) 
Automotive complex (3410) (3420) (3430)  
Dynamic and new technologies (2421) (2423) (2911) (2912) (2913) 
(2914) (2915) (2919) (2921) (2922) (2923) 
(2924) (2925) (2926) (2927) (2929) (2930) 
(3000) (3110) (3120) (3210) (3220) (3311) 
(3312) (3313) (3511) (3520) (3530)  
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Table 1: Distribution of different types of affiliates according to the Ferraz 
classification of industries* 
 
 Type of Firm Commodities Food 
processing 
commodities 
Traditional 
sectors 
Durable 
goods 
Automotive 
complex 
Diffuser of 
technology 
Domestic Firms 107 33 391 25 24 98 
% 15.78 4.8 57.67 3.69 3.54 14.45 
Acquired Firms 7 3 18 3 4 6 
% 17.07 7.3 44 7.32 9.76 1.46 
Subsidiaries all 35 7 67 5 11 25 
% 23.3 4.67 44.67 3.33 8.46 16.67 
Total 149 43 476 33 39 129 
 % 17.15 4.9 54.78 3.8 4.49 14.84 
 
Source: Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-2001 
*See Annex for explanation. 
The cells indicate number of firms and participation by row, so the first cell for commodities and domestic 
firms indicates that in 1996 there were 107 domestic firms in commodities type of industries, which 
represented 15.78% of all domestic firms.  
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Table 2: Foreign participation in the Argentinean industrial sector (1996 and 
2001)* 
FDI % 
1996 2001 
 
Total 
employment Total sales 
Number of 
firms 
Total 
employment Total sales 
Number of 
firms 
Tobacco Industries 100 100 100 62 95 22 
Petroleum refining and related industries 79 89 46 86 95 50 
Electronics 65 78 19 39 49 20 
Stone clay glass and concrete products 55 68 27 40 45 22 
Chemicals and allied products 57 66 44 59 68 41 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 56 66 22 30 43 15 
Primary metal industries 62 62 22 67 78 17 
Paper and allied products 43 55 18 40 56 24 
Motor vehicles and equipment 54 54 34 83 96 42 
Communication equipment 50 49 29 90 94 50 
Machinery and equipment 46 46 15 25 36 21 
Food and kindred products 31 42 13 29 53 16 
Precision, photographic medical optical 22 38 20 4 10 9 
Lumber and wood products except furniture 25 29 7 10 33 10 
Textile mill products 28 28 8 9 13 10 
Leather and leather products 23 26 11 12 26 11 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 17 25 6 7 16 6 
Fabricated metal products 22 20 15 45 59 20 
Printing publishing and allied products 14 14 13 17 14 13 
Transportation equipment 1 1 5 28 36 5 
Apparel and other finished products 0 0 0 5 7 4 
Computer and office equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-2001 
* The cells indicate foreign participation in total employment, sales and number of firms per sector. The first row 
indicates therefore that 100% of employees in tobacco industries in 1996 were employed by MNE affiliates, while 
the same participation decreased to 62% in 2001.  
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Table 3: Three different type of firms: Some general features 
Type of Firm N1 Total 
Employment2 
Market Share Investments 
Intensity 
Export Intensity
YEAR 1992     
Domestic Firms 678 169 3% 11% 8% 
Acquired Firms 41 547 4% 11% 9% 
Subsidiaries all 
period 
150 584 6% 10% 13% 
Average all firms 4 869 258 3% 10% 9% 
YEAR 1998     
Domestic Firms 698 171 4% 6% 9% 
Acquired Firms 41 361 5% 13% 16% 
Subsidiaries all 
period 
130 551 10% 9% 22% 
Average all firms 4 869 236 5% 7% 12% 
Source: Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-2001 
1 Number of firms 
2 Average number of employees per type of firm. So, the first cell indicates that in 1992 the typical 
domestic firms employed 169 workers 
3 Total investment /total sales: average per type of firm. So for domestic firms in 1992 the typical firm 
invest 11% of its total sales. 
4 The row average contains the same indicator per type of firm without distinction according origin of 
capital.  
 
Table 4: Evolution indicators of human capital development by type of firm: 
Professionals and skills intensity of labour. 
 1992 1996 1998 2001 
 Total Total Total Total 
 PROFESSIONALS     
Domestic firms 11 11 15 11 
Acquired 71 63 63 56 
Subsidiaries 89 104 113 111 
Average all firms 27 29 31 31 
SKILLS % % % % 
Domestic firms 5 6 7 7 
Acquired 7 8 14 18 
Subsidiaries 16 18 20 22 
Average all firms 7 8 9 10 
Source: Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-2001 
1 Acquired firms are those that were domestic in the first period (1992-1996) and subsidiaries in the second 
(1998-2001).  
2 Professionals is the average total number of professionals per type of firm. So the table indicates that in 
1992 domestic firms in average employed 11 professionals, while acquired firms employed 71 and 
subsidiaries 89. 
3 Skills is calculated as professionals over total employment. 
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Table 5 Evolution intensity of expenditures in training activities* 
 Training Expenditures 
 1998 2001 
Type of firm Total 
Expenditure1 
Per Worker Total 
Expenditures 
Per Worker 
     
Domestic firms 8064 39 7156 33.9 
Acquired Firms 39317 71 43689 98.2 
     
Subsidiaries 67313 160 80501 162.7 
Total 18414 59 19867 56.9 
Source: Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-2001 
* The values are expressed in Argentinean pesos.  
1 Indicates total expenditures on average per each type of firm. Thus, the first cell indicates that the typical 
domestic firm in 1998 spent 8064 pesos on training, while the typical acquired firm spent 39317 pesos.  
 
 
Table 6: Evolution indicators human resources in innovation tasks 
  
Type of firm 
  
% Employees in R&D 
  
  1998 2001 
  Total 
number of 
employees 
in R&D1 
Intensity 
% 
Total 
Number of 
employees 
in R&D 
Intensit
y % 
Domestic firms 
 
2 2.00 2 2.4 
Acquired Firms 11 2.90 11 3.50 
Subsidiaries all 7 2.00 8 2.40 
Average all 
firms 
2.9 2.20% 3.4 2.40% 
Source: Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-2001 
1 Average number of employees in R&D 
 39
Table 7: Evolution of intensity expenditures in R&D   
Years 1992 1996 1998 2001 
Type of firm Intensity of Expenditures In R&D (%)1 
Domestic Firms 0.34 0.12 1.70 1.50 
Acquired Firms 1.08 0.15 2.00 1.60 
Subsidiaries all 0.47 0.15 2.90 2.00 
      
Total 0.39 0.12 1.90 1.60 
Source: Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-2001 
1 R&D total expenditures / sales 
 
 
Table 8: Indirect effects: Productivity Spillovers towards domestic firms: 
Regressing added value at the plant level on inputs, knowledge capital (R&D and 
skills) and the share of foreign firms at the industry level a 
Variables Productivity spillovers 
I/Y 0.029 
  (3.15)*** 
ΔlnL 0.58 
  (10.79)*** 
ΔFDIj -0.15 
  (-1.38) 
FDIlag 0.0028 
 (0.04) 
ΔlnCK 0.040 
  (1.89)* 
ΔSkills -0.02 
  (-2.29)** 
Skills 0.021 
 (3.73)*** 
ΔImppen 0.094 
  (4.24)*** 
ΔConcentration -0.27 
  (-1.32)** 
Constant -0.28 
  (-3.33)** 
Observations 1406 
R2 50% 
Source: Authors calculations based on two Argentinean Innovation Surveys 1992-1996, and 1998-2001 
Notes:  a  All standard errors, in parenthesis, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *significant at 10 % level, 
**significant at  5% and *** at 1% level. 
The dependent variable is the difference of the natural log added value. Changes in employment and 
knowledge capital (L and CK) have been also introduced in natural logs, so their coefficients express 
elasticities. Investment over product is lagged one period. The estimation includes a time dummy and 21 
industry dummies. ΔFDIi measure changes in foreign employment participation at the 5-digits industry, and 
FDIt-1 is a lag, the participation of foreign capital the previous period. For 2001 the previous period is 
1998, for 1998 is 1996 and for 1996 1992. OLS used to estimate the coefficients. 
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Table 9: Indirect effects: Skills spillovers towards domestic firms: Regressing skills 
intensity of domestic firms at the plant level on size, knowledge capital (R&D and 
other investments in capital goods for innovations) and the share of foreign firms at 
industry levela 
Variables Skills Spillovers 
ΔlnL -0.048 
  (-9.35)** 
ΔFDIj 0.009 
  (0.63) 
FDIlag -0.088 
 (-2.42)** 
LnCK 0.00053 
 (1.01) 
ΔlnCK 0.0007 
  (0.19) 
ΔConcentration 0.041 
  (1.81)** 
Constant 0.29 
  (12)** 
Observations 2033 
Source: Authors calculations based on the Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-1996 
Notes:  a  All standard errors, in parenthesis, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *significant at 10 % level, 
**significant at 5% and *** at 1% level. 
For this estimation we use fixed effects after rejecting OLS using the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange 
multiplier test for random effects and the possibility of a random effect model with the test of Hausman. 
The dependent variable is the skills intensity of domestic firms, calculated as professionals over total 
employees. All the other variables are the same than in the previous estimation. 
OLS is used to estimate the coefficients. 
 
 
